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Many trade negotiations involve large cuts in high 
tariffs, with flexibilities allowing much smaller cuts for 
an agreed number of politically-sensitive products. The 
effects of these flexibilities on market access opportunities 
are difficult to predict, creating particular problems for 
developing countries in assessing whether to support 
a proposed agreement. Some widely-used ad hoc 
approaches to identifying likely sensitive products—such 
as the highest-bound-tariff rule—suggest that the impacts 
of a limited number of such exceptions on average tariffs 
and on market access are likely to be minor. This paper 
uses a rigorous specification based on the apparent 
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objectives of policy makers in setting the pre-negotiation 
tariff. Applying this approach with detailed data allows 
the authors to assess the implications of sensitive-product 
provisions for average agricultural tariffs, economic 
welfare, and market access under the Doha negotiations. 
The authors conclude that highest-tariff rules are likely 
to seriously underestimate the impacts on average tariffs, 
and that treating even 2 percent of tariff lines as sensitive 
is likely to have a sharply adverse impact on economic 
welfare. The impacts on market access are also adverse, 
but much smaller, perhaps reflecting the mercantilist 
focus of the negotiating process.  
 
 
Formulas and Flexibility in Trade Negotiations: Sensitive 





































*INRA and CEPII, Paris; **IFPRI and ***World Bank, Washington DC. The views in this paper are those 
of the authors alone and not necessarily those of the institutions with which they are affiliated. 
  
 
Formulas and Flexibility in Trade Negotiations: Sensitive 
Agricultural Products in the WTO’s Doha Agenda 
In recent years, a common feature of trade negotiations involving developing countries 
has been the use of a formula approach to tariff cutting, coupled with provisions for 
smaller, or zero, cuts in particular products. This approach follows a pattern observed in 
earlier WTO Rounds (Martin and Winters 1996) and regional agreements (Olarreaga and 
Soloaga 1998), where ambitious tariff reduction goals were combined with discretion for 
particular, politically-sensitive, products. One difference is that the specific products to 
be subjected to smaller cuts were typically directly negotiated in earlier agreements, 
while the Doha agenda “modalities” for agriculture specify the share of products allowed 
smaller cuts, leaving the choice of products to the discretion of the importer.  
The approach being followed in the WTO agricultural negotiations (WTO 2004, 
2008) specifies larger proportional cuts in higher bound tariffs but allows reduced cuts 
for “sensitive” products selected by members. Earlier work suggests this approach may 
make market access gains particularly susceptible to erosion through exclusion of a small 
number of goods, particularly in the industrial countries where the variance of 
agricultural tariffs is very high (Jean, Laborde and Martin 2006).  
While discretion for smaller cuts on their own sensitive products is attractive to 
individual policy makers, it raises difficult questions for policy makers and for analysts 
making  ex ante  evaluations of proposed agreements. These problems are particularly 
acute for policy makers from small developing countries. While large traders may have 
the resources to estimate the direct impact of key partners’ choices on their market access 
reasonably well, small developing countries frequently have difficulty doing so. Both 2 
 
groups remain vulnerable to importers changing their choice of products at the last 
moment. Analysts attempting to provide policy makers with ex ante  assessments of 
proposed global agreements face a different and perhaps even more serious challenge—
they need a consistent basis for assessing the use of these flexibilities in 153 WTO 
member countries. 
One widely-used approach to ex ante assessment is to assume that flexibility will 
be used for the highest bound (Sharma 2006) or applied (WTO 2006) tariffs. These 
approaches lead to a sharp conclusion—that the impacts of flexibilities on cuts in average 
tariffs will be small. The highly variable, and frequently large, gaps between bound and 
applied agricultural tariffs (Jean, Laborde and Martin 2006) raise important questions—
would products with high bound tariffs really be selected if the bound rate remains above 
the applied rate even after the bound rate is cut, and hence no reduction in applied rates is 
required? Even high applied rates may not be subject to cuts if the binding overhang on 
these products is sufficiently large. Further, these approaches ignore the importance of 
the product—high tariffs are frequently observed on very minor products. 
To deal with these concerns, Jean, Laborde and Martin (2006) proposed a 
minimization-of-tariff-revenue-loss rule that takes into account the size of the cut in 
applied tariffs resulting from the formula and binding overhang, and the initial value of 
imports. This approach leads to a strikingly different conclusion—that even a small 
number of sensitive products can dramatically reduce the cuts in average agricultural 
tariffs. In this situation, it seems particularly desirable to have an approach with stronger 
behavioral foundations.  3 
 
To estimate the effects of flexibilities requires a forecast of the products likely to 
be chosen, and an estimate of the effects of these choices on efficiency and market 
access. We first develop a simple, theoretically-well-grounded, model of the preferences 
of policy makers, and then use it to assess which agricultural products WTO members are 
likely to treat as sensitive. Our approach focuses on policy choices within a single 
country, building on the framework developed by Grossman and Helpman (1994) and 
others in the political-economy literature. It provides a much-needed ex ante assessment 
of the impact of policy choices on market access and welfare, and a basis for ex post 
testing should the current negotiations be successfully completed. 
An important question for current and future negotiations is whether the 
combination of ambitious tariff-cutting formulas with flexibilities allowing small cuts on 
relatively high tariffs makes sense from economic or mercantilist perspectives. To shed 
light on this issue, we use the Anderson-Neary (2007) approach with the most 
disaggregated data available at the international level to assess the implications of 
flexibility for both welfare and market access. 
We assume that the agricultural tariff prior to the negotiations results from 
maximization of a government objective function along the lines of the Grossman-
Helpman (1994) model. This approach seems appropriate for agricultural tariffs in the 
current negotiations because they have not been effectively disciplined by multilateral 
agreements (Hathaway and Ingco 1996). We consider a liberalization agreement 
involving a tariff-reduction formula together with flexibility for sensitive products, and 
focus on the way policy makers use this flexibility at any given level of world prices. The 
combined effect of the decisions by all 153 members leads to changes in domestic and 4 
 
international prices that members must take into account in deciding whether to accept 
the agreement. 
Our first step is to develop an objective function for government policy making. 
Then, in Section II, we use this function to assess the implications of changes in tariffs 
under alternative assumptions about the structure of preferences. In Section III, we 
discuss the data and tariff-cutting formulas on which we base our analysis. Section IV 
contains applications to real-world data designed to assess the likely outcomes for 
average tariffs; to provide comparisons with earlier approaches; and to examine the 
sensitivity of outcomes to different rules for sensitive products. In Section V, we examine 
the implications of sensitive products for economic welfare in the country utilizing the 
flexibility and for the market access opportunities of partner countries. Section VI 
concludes. 
I.  Representing Governments’ Objective Functions 
We begin by specifying an objective function for policy makers that takes into account 
the benefits to politicians from providing protection to particular sectors while 
considering the costs to consumers and taxpayers of providing this protection. Our 
political-economy objective function—based on Grossman and Helpman (1994, equation 
5)—is expressed as: 
p h p* p z p p p ' ) ( ' ) , ( ) , ( + − + − = u z u G   (1) 
Where z(p,u)=e(p,u)-g(p) is the trade expenditure function, defined as the difference 
between the consumer expenditure function e(p,u) defined over domestic prices, p and 
the utility level of the representative household, u, and a net revenue function, g(p),  
defined over domestic prices for given factor endowments; p* is the vector of world 5 
 
prices for traded goods, so that (p-p*) is a vector of specific tariff rates; zp = ep – gp is a 
vector of net imports; zp´(p-p*) is tariff revenues, assumed to be redistributed to the 
household; and the elements of h reflect the valuation by governments of changes in 
domestic prices, over and above their impact on general economic welfare. We consider 
only tariffs because domestic and export subsidies are dealt with under different “pillars” 
of the negotiations.  
Like Grossman and Helpman (1994, proposition 2) and virtually all subsequent 
applications based on this model, we assume that importers and governments view import 
prices as fixed, so that changing tariffs from their initial level involves a reduction in the 
value of the government’s objective function. For individual governments choosing their 
own protection levels on individual commodities, this seems reasonable for relatively 
homogenous agricultural products given that the estimated export supply elasticities for 
homogenous goods are five times as high as for other products (Broda, Limao and 
Weinstein 2008, p2033). It also seems consistent with the approach taken by agricultural 
policy makers dealing with product-specific issues such as the “tariffication” of non-tariff 
barriers (Hathaway and Ingco 1996).  
If we move beyond the Grossman-Helpman (1994) model, the h weights may also 
reflect a number of political-economy features identified by authors such as Anderson 
and Hayami (1986), Lindert (1991), Olarreaga and Soloaga (1998), Cadot, de Melo and 
Olarreaga (2004), and Dutt and Mitra (2010)  that influence how much protection a 
particular agricultural sector will receive. These include: (i) how effectively the sector is 
organized; (ii) the impact of own-output prices on returns to specific factors in that 
sector; (iii) adverse impacts on the costs of other politically-influential groups of 6 
 
protecting a particular sector; and (iv) the ratio of imports to domestic consumption that 
determines the balance of benefits between tariff revenues and transfers to producers, and 
(v) the degree of concentration in the sector. In contrast with the studies above, our 
objective is not to explain the premium placed by policy makers on higher prices for 
particular goods. Rather, we use the observed policy choices to infer the elements of h —
something that is feasible for highly disaggregated products.  
Since we assume that the political-economy objective function is being 
maximized in the initial equilibrium, we can use the first order conditions to solve for h: 
) p* (p z h
0 0




0-p*) is the marginal welfare cost of tariff changes around (p-p*), and the 
superscript 
0 refers to values at the initial equilibrium (since world prices are assumed to 
be constant, p*
0 = p*). The revealed value of h for product i clearly depends on the tariff 
for that sector. However, hi depends also on the slope of the demand curve, zii, and the 
cross-price effects with other goods subject to tariffs, zij. In addition, for any given import 
demand elasticity, the value of hi increases with import volume. Note that hi for a good 
with a zero tariff will be negative if there are positive tariffs on its substitutes and none 
on any complements. Sectors that are organized will likely have positive values of hi 
while unorganized sectors are expected to have negative values. Equations (1) and (2) 
together show the strong link between our approach and the Grossman-Helpman (1994) 
formulation.
1
At any point where producers and consumers are making optimizing decisions 
relative to domestic prices, zppp =0. Equation (2) can thus be simplified to: 
 
* p z h
0
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Equation (2′) includes all prices, and must yield exactly the same estimates as (2). It 
allows us to rewrite (1) in terms of potentially observable terms:  
p z p*' p*) (p z ) (p,
0
pp p + − + − = u z G   (1′) 
Equation (1′) provides the basis for our subsequent analysis. 
II.  Implications of Tariff Changes for the Objective Function  
A second-order Taylor-Series expansion of equation (1′) around the initial equilibrium 
provides insights into the implications of tariff changes that change p relative to p*. We 
begin by taking the first and second derivatives of (1′) with respect to prices: 
pp
0
pp z p*) - (p       z p*'
p
'    + =
∂
∂G   and  p*) - (p z     z
p




2G   (3) 
For lack of information about the third derivatives of the trade expenditure function, we 
assume that the trade expenditure function can be adequately represented by a function 
such as the normalized quadratic introduced by Diewert and Ostensoe (1988) or the 
symmetric normalized quadratic used by Kohli (1993) to model import demand. As noted 
by these authors, these are flexible functional forms and hence can provide a second-
order approximation at any point to any twice-differentiable functional form, such as the 
widely-used, but much less flexible, CES function. Given this assumption, the zppp term 
in equation (3) can be dropped and the implications of deviations in tariffs from the 
domestic political-economy optimum can be analyzed using the Taylor-Series expansion: 


















G   (4) 
Equation (4) is particularly simple because the initial equilibrium is an optimum from the 
point of view of the government acting unilaterally. It contains none of the interactions 8 
 
with existing distortions that complicate calculation of standard welfare effects (see 
Martin 1997).  The quadratic nature of equation (4) immediately reveals a problem with 
the tariff-revenue-loss rule of Jean, Laborde and Martin (2006)—the impact of a 
reduction in the required tariff cut on the value of the government’s objective function 
will depend not only on the size of the price increase allowed by sensitive product status, 
but also on the size of the initial cut required by the formula. 
Further insights into the effects of particular tariff changes can be obtained by 
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  (4') 
where  e  is initial expenditure on all  goods and services, including the non-distorted 
numeraire, n; si is the share of expenditure on good i; ηij is the elasticity of demand for 
good i relative to the price of good j; and the vector p ˆ  refers to proportional changes in 
domestic prices. Where the bound tariff equals the applied, 𝑝𝑝i � =
−𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖
(1+𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖)  where ci is the 
tariff cut required by the formula. The relationship is less direct, but still readily 
computable,  when  bound  tariffs  exceed  applied  rates.  We  express  ΔG  relative  to  e, 
without loss of generality, because this allows us to use value shares, rather than gross 
values, as weights on the elasticity matrix.  
For simplicity and tractability, a product-by-product analysis can prove useful. 
This is possible based on (4´), since the impact of allowing sensitive-product treatment 
for product i on the government’s objective function can be computed as the difference 9 
 
between the welfare loss with the formula applied to product i,  ) ( | i f e
G ∆
 and with 
sensitive-product treatment,  ) ( | i s e
G ∆
. If we let  i p ˆ represent the impact of the formula cut 
on pi and the cut with flexibility be  ) ~ ˆ ( i i p p +  where  0 ~ ≥ i p  is the increase in the price 
from the post-formula level as a proportion of its initial domestic price, we obtain, 
following the steps outlined in the Technical Appendix:  
] ˆ 2 ~ [ ~
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   (5) 
A key insight from equation (5) not available from equation (4) is the potential 
importance of the size of the formula cuts on other goods for the selection of good i.  
Unfortunately, we do not have the matrix of own and cross-price elasticities for 
over 5000 products included in equation (4'). If we use CES preferences to obtain local, 
theoretically-consistent, estimates of these elasticities, the own-price elasticities are given 
by -(1-si).σ , where σ is the elasticity of substitution, and the cross-price elasticities, ηij are 
given by σ.sj. As shown in the Technical Appendix, equations (4') and (5) can then be 
rewritten including cross-price effects as: 
) ˆ ( .
2
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with  ) ˆ (p VAR  the weighted ( i s ) variance of price changes  i p ˆ ; and 
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σ   (5') 
Note that in this CES framework the choice of sensitive products is independent of σ.  
Two features of equation (5') allow us to identify a potential simplified rule for 
selecting individual tariff lines: (i) since dutiable agricultural goods usually represent a 10 
 
small share of total expenditure, including goods that are not imported subject to tariffs, 
j j i j p s ˆ
≠ Σ  is likely to be negligible in (5'); and (ii) with such a large number of sensitive 
products, it is likely that  j j i j p s ˆ
≠ Σ   is very similar for almost all choices of potential 
sensitive products, leaving the ranking of products unchanged even if  j j i j p s ˆ
≠ Σ   is 
nontrivial. With either or both of these assumptions, a simplified measure of the impact 
of designating product i as sensitive is: 
) ˆ ) ~ ˆ )(( 1 (
2
1 G G 2 2
) ( ) (
i i i i i
i f i s
p p p s s
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σ   (6) 
In the CES case, equation (6) provides a simple rule of thumb for selecting sensitive 
products that depends only on observable information on the expenditure share of the 
good in the presence of tariffs, si; the size of the price cut implied by the formula and any 
binding overhang; and the extent to which sensitive product selection allows a smaller cut 
in its price, 𝑝𝑝i � . The intuition of this measure is clear: it compares two triangles—formed 
by multiplying the elasticity of import demand -(1-si)σ by a squared proportional change 
in prices— to measure the reduction in the loss of policy maker welfare when sensitive 
products are allowed.  
The logic of the simplification involved in moving from equation (5') to equation 
(6) might also be used to justify a similar simplification of equation (5): 
) ˆ ) ~ ˆ ((
2
1 G G 2 2
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This approach follows Feenstra (1995) in using just the own-price terms to assess 
the implications of a tariff regime. It is particularly attractive since Kee, Nicita and 11 
 





III.  Data and Tariff Formulas 
We use the MAcMapHS6 v1.1 database (Bouët et al. 2008) on applied protection in the 
base year for the negotiations, 2001. This dataset includes key features such as the ad 
valorem equivalents of specific tariffs; an assessment of the impact of tariff-rate quotas 
(TRQs) on many key commodities; tariff preferences, and import values. The analysis is 
carried out at the finest level at which country classifications are internationally 
compatible: the six-digit level of the Harmonized System.
3 The protective effect of TRQs 
is represented by using the in-quota tariff when the quota is less than 90 percent filled; 
the out-of-quota tariff when the quota is filled; and their average in between. Adjustments 
were made for Korean corn and soybeans, where imports over high out-of-quota tariffs 
appear to be very large, but the TRQs are, in fact, expanded to meet demand. A pre-
experiment introduced reforms that will proceed irrespective of the Doha outcome, 
including expansion of the European Union, the phase-in of remaining agricultural 
commitments by developing countries,
4
The negotiations specify cuts in WTO bound tariffs, which are frequently well 
above applied rates. This binding overhang means that reductions in bound tariffs will not 
always bring about corresponding reductions in applied rates or increases in market 
access. A detailed dataset on bound duties (see Bchir et al. 2006) conformable with the 
MAcMapHS6 applied rate data was used to specify the cuts in bound rates. Applied rates 
were reduced to the extent that the new bound rate declined below the initial applied rate.  
 and reforms agreed by WTO accession countries. 12 
 
The analysis uses the tariff cut proposal that has shaped the negotiations—the 
proposal by the G-20 of a tiered formula with four bands and three inflexion points (G-20 
2005). For the industrial countries, this involves proportional cuts in bound tariffs that 
increase through four tiers to reach 75 percent on tariffs above 75 percent. For developing 
countries, the cuts rise to 40 percent on tariffs above 130 percent. Tariffs are capped at 
100 percent for developed countries and 150 percent for developing countries. Least-
developed countries are not required to undertake any reduction commitments.  
Bound tariffs on sensitive products can be cut by one third or two thirds of the 
formula cut, with increases in TRQs required to compensate trading partners for the 
resulting loss of market access (WTO 2008). We assume that the combined effect of the 
tariff cut and TRQ expansion for a sensitive product with a TRQ is one-half the formula 
cut. 
IV.  Experiments and Impacts on Average Tariffs 
We used four different approaches to identifying sensitive products. The first was to 
solve equation (1') using nonlinear integer programming. However, we encountered 
multiple solutions using this nonlinear approach. We therefore turned to approaches 
based on the second-order approximations discussed in Section II. Our initial results were 
obtained by solving equation (4'') using the SBB (Branch & Bound) GAMS® solver for 
Mixed Integer Nonlinear Programming (MINLP) (see GAMS 2010) with up to 2 percent 
of products allowed as sensitive. This was complemented by simple one-product-at-a-
time selections using equation (6), and equation (7) with the own-price elasticities of 
Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga (2008).  13 
 
The scenario against which we assess the impact of sensitive products applies the 
formulas to all products, without exception ("Formula" column in Table 1). We first 
compare these results against those using our three approaches to identifying two percent 
of sensitive products. We then compare these results with those from the three ad hoc 
approaches used in earlier studies—  “highest bound”, “highest applied” and “tariff 
losses”. Next, we examine the potential sensitivity of our results to whether or not 
sensitive products include “sin” products, which might have high tariffs to discourage 
consumption rather than for political-economy reasons. Then, we consider the sensitivity 
of the results to the number of tariffs allowed sensitive treatment. Finally, we consider the 
implications of an alternative approach of basing the share of sensitive products on the 
percentage of imports, rather than a percentage of tariff lines. 
Our results for the “Formula” scenario are given in the second column of Table 1. 
Even though the formulas more than halve average bound tariffs worldwide, the 
reductions in applied rates are smaller because of binding overhang. With no sensitive 
products, the average tariff for non-LDC WTO members is cut by 6 percentage points, 
from 14.6 percent to 8.6 percent (Table 1, column "Formula"). Among the main countries 
shown in Table 1, only Canada, the EU, EFTA, Japan and South Korea display more than 
a 5 percentage point cut in applied rates. Indeed liberalization appears to be 
overwhelmingly concentrated in Japan, EFTA and Korea, with very limited liberalization 
elsewhere.
5  For many countries, applied duties are hardly changed: 8 out of the 18 
countries and groups shown in Table 1 experience a decline in applied duties of less than 
two percentage points. The formula considered narrows the binding overhang in many 
cases, without substantially changing applied rates.  14 
 
Table 3 displays the products most frequently selected as sensitive by developed 
and developing countries when 2 percent of sensitive products are selected 
simultaneously using equation (4''). For comparison purposes, Appendix Table 1 
compares these products with those selected using the highest-average tariff rules, and 
considers the coverage of agricultural imports for the different sets of products 
considered. This comparison shows that selecting products based on the highest tariffs 
leads to frequent inclusion of minor products, such as “foliage branches”, “maize 
stalks”, and “garlic” in the industrial countries  and “other cereals”, with a share in 
agricultural imports of only one-hundredth of a percent in developing countries. A 
striking difference between the lists selected using equation (2´) and the highest-tariff 
rules is in the share of agricultural imports covered. Our political-economy approach 
results in a list of most-common sensitive products covering 80 (63)  percent of 
agricultural imports into the industrial (developing) countries, while the highest bound 
tariff rule leads to a list covering only 5 (7) percent. 
The resulting impacts for countries’ own weighted-average tariffs are presented 
in Table 1 (column "Sens 2"). Allowing 2 percent sensitive products, the cut in the 
world wide average applied duty drops from 6 percentage points to 3.1. Four relatively-
highly-protected Harmonized System chapters, Meat and offal (02), Cereals (10), Fruits 
(08) and Sugar (17), accounting for 27 percent of total imports, contribute 67 percent of 
the tariff cut without exclusions, but 80 percent of the reduction in tariff cuts when 
sensitive products are introduced. For developing countries, four chapters (01-Meat, 10-
Cereals, 12-Oilseeds and 24-Tobacco) cover 25 percent of total imports and contribute 
51 percent of the basic cut but 64 percent of the reduction in the cut.  15 
 
Using the simplified criterion in equation (6) ("Sens 2-simple") changes the 
aggregate results very little. This is reassuring, given that algorithms for simultaneous 
product selection are unlikely to be available to policy makers. The results based on 
equation (7) (“Sens 2-elas”) are somewhat higher than those for “Sens 2-simple”, 
reflecting the fact that the elasticity criterion used in their selection does not enter the 
calculation of the standard trade-weighted averages.
6
An important question is how our results compare with the ad-hoc alternatives 
used in earlier policy analyses. Scenario "Sens 2-highest bound" uses Sharma’s (2006, 
p5) rule-of-thumb of selecting the products with the highest bound  tariffs. This 
approach turns out to yield dramatically lower estimates of the impact of sensitive 
products on applied rates: the cut in the average applied tariff is found to decline by just 
over one percentage point when sensitive products are selected this way. If products 
with the highest applied  tariffs ("Sens 2-highest applied") are chosen as sensitive 
(Martin and Wang 2004; WTO 2006), the impact on average tariffs is still much 
smaller. These two rules select many minor products with high tariffs.  
 
Column (8), “Sens 2-tariff loss” selects sensitive products by minimizing tariff 
revenue losses. At the aggregate level, the results using this criterion differ little from 
those using our political-economy approach. At a disaggregated level, we find that our 
political-economy criteria pick some products—such as virgin olive oil for the 
European Union—that seem likely to be treated as exceptions, but are not identified 
using the tariff revenue loss criterion. 
As is clear from Table 3, some of the WTO-agricultural products selected as 
“sensitive” are “sin” tax commodities such as cigarettes or alcohol. If high duties on these 16 
 
products are being used to raise revenues or to reduce externalities, countries may not 
follow a political-economy rule when choosing sensitive products. To guard against this, 
“Sens 2-sin” is derived using the same approach as “Sens 2” but excluding “sin” 
commodities such as alcohol and tobacco from the sensitive product category. This 
exclusion is found to lead to cuts in average tariffs that are similar to those without this 
exclusion. The increase in the cut with this exclusion is from 4.3 to 4.5 percent in the 
industrial countries, and from 1.2 to 1.6 percent in developing countries. This exclusion 
does change the composition of the products selected. In developed countries, 
preparations of meat and fish, and dairy products become more important, as do dairy 
products, fruits, meats and fats in developing countries.  
While our analysis so far has focused on allowing 2 percent of tariff lines, many 
WTO members have sought much higher percentages of tariff lines.
7
While the agricultural negotiations under the Doha Agenda have focused on 
restricting the number of sensitive products, constraints on the value of trade have been 
used in some other negotiations.
 We find that raising 
the number of sensitive products to 4 percent (“Sens 4”) using the political economy 
criterion in equation (4'') has only a small impact, except in a few cases such as Japan and 
EFTA. Overall, the extent of delivered liberalization is only slightly reduced because 
sheltering just 2 percent of products is enough to greatly reduce the cut in average tariffs.  
8 To shed light on the differences between constraints 
based on trade and those based on tariff lines, we compare the results for “Sens 2” and 
“Sens 4” with those where imports are constrained by import value—“Sens 2-trade” and 
“Sens 4-trade”. This comparison shows considerable differences. The global reduction in 
average tariffs is 4.8 percent under “Sens 2-trade”, as against 3.1 percent under “Sens 2”. 17 
 
As compared to the “Formula” scenario, allowing 2 percent of imports as sensitive 
products based on trade causes the cut in world average tariffs to decline from 6.0 percent 
to 4.8 percent, with limited reductions in the resulting tariff cuts in most cases, in contrast 
with the dramatic and unpredictable reductions in disciplines associated with sensitive 
product limits based on tariff lines.  
Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between the number of sensitive products and 
the final level of tariffs in a general way, by plotting the relationship between the number 
of sensitive products allowed, and the average level of applied protection. When the 
constraint is expressed in terms of number of products, the curve is indeed extremely 
steep near the y-axis: a very small share of sensitive products is enough to sweep out a 
significant part of the applied tariff cut. This is even clearer for developed countries than 
for developing countries. When defined as an import share, in contrast, changes in the 
number of sensitive products have a far less precipitous impact on tariff cuts. As far as 
developed countries are concerned, allowing 5 percent of initial imports to be defined as 
sensitive products reduces tariff cuts by approximately one third, 10 percent of imports 
would reduce them by almost two-thirds. 
While trade is also an imperfect criterion—since highly-restricted products are 
likely to have small imports—it seems clear that its deficiencies as a basis for specifying 
sensitive products are less serious than those associated with the number of tariff lines. 
There is an important underlying  reason for this better performance—external trade 
reflects the interests of the exporter rather than solely those of interest groups within the 
importing country.  18 
 
Table 2 presents results corresponding to those in Table 1 for the case of 2 percent 
sensitive products but this time for the protection faced by each country. A sharp 
difference between the results for protection applied and protection faced is evident for 
developing countries. For most developing countries, allowing sensitive products reduces 
the extent of required own-liberalization very little because the cuts in their own applied 
rates in the absence of sensitive products are quite small. By contrast, allowing sensitive 
products results in a very substantial reduction in market access gains.  The average 
reduction in tariffs facing developing countries declines by almost 3 percentage points—
from 5.5 percent to 2.7 percent.  
V.  Implications for Welfare and Market Access 
The average tariff measures reported in Tables 1 and 2 provide a broad—and widely 
understood—indication of the consequences of including flexibilities for the economic 
welfare and for market access. However, it is well known that the weighted average tariff 
is a flawed indicator of the efficiency or market access impacts of reform.  
Anderson and Neary (2007) propose an integrating treatment of the problems of 
aggregation and the implications of trade reforms for welfare and market access. Their 
results provide a rigorous link between means and variances of tariff (specifically, 
generalized means and generalized variances that reflect substitution relationships 
between goods) and key policy outcomes including economic welfare and market access. 
For the special model in which the expenditure function over all goods (domestic and 
imported) takes the Constant-Elasticity of Substitution form, and domestic and imported 
goods are imperfect substitutes, the needed measures of the economy-wide generalized 
mean and variance can be calculated easily. 19 
 
Using these estimates of the generalized means and variances, we can assess the 
implications of the flexibilities considered in this article for welfare in the importing 
countries, and for the market access available to their partners. A key finding of 
Anderson and Neary (2007) is that there are important differences in the impact of an 
increase in the variability of tariffs on welfare and on market access. Increases in the 
generalized variance of a tariff regime reduce welfare but will expand market access at a 
constant generalized mean (Anderson and Neary, 2007, p192, equation 16 and p193, 
equation 21). It seems likely that allowing sensitive products will increase the variance of 
the trade regime. Questions for policy makers therefore arise. Will a policy of allowing 
sensitive products have a less adverse impact on partners’ market access than it has on 
the welfare of the country using the flexibility? And what are the magnitudes of these 
impacts? 
A key issue is the impact of changes in the mean and variance of tariffs from 
allowing sensitive products for welfare and for market access. Figure 2(a) shows that the 
real income loss due to sensitive products is, in most countries, more a function of the 
rise in the tariff variance than of the mean tariff. By contrast, Figure 2(b) shows that the 
increased tariff variance associated with sensitive products substantially reduces the 
market-closing impacts of the increase in the mean. These findings are consistent with the 
demonstration by Kee (2007) and Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga (2008) that increases in the 
weighted variance raise the efficiency-oriented Trade Restrictiveness Index, while not 
affecting the mercantilist measure of trade restrictiveness. They highlight a reason that 
negotiators in a mercantilist forum like the WTO might choose deep tariff-cutting 20 
 
formulas combined with exceptions—the damage to market access is less than the 
damage to efficiency.  
These results imply that it is important to look beyond average impacts when 
analyzing the impact of free trade on efficiency and market access. Reductions in tariffs 
resulting from the formula approach raise welfare both through the reduction in the 
generalized mean tariff and through reductions in the generalized variance. These results 
strongly reinforce the need to go beyond average impacts. 
VI.  Concluding Remarks 
The impact of exceptions from tariff-cutting formulas in the Doha negotiations has been a 
major source of uncertainty and conflict. Some widely-used rules of thumb for their 
selection suggest that their overall impacts would be minor. We derive approaches to 
selection based on a political-economy framework applicable at a fine level of 
disaggregation, and estimate likely impacts on key outcomes from the negotiations.  
We show that allowing even a limited number of products to be subjected to 
smaller cuts is likely to substantially reduce the extent of trade liberalization in the 
developed countries, while developing countries gain little in this mercantilist sense. In 
contrast, the costs to exporters are shared, and developing countries see their market 
access gains fall substantially with sensitive product exceptions.   
We find that approaches to sensitive-product identification based only on the 
height of the tariff greatly underestimate their impact. However, we identify a simple 
approach using only readily-available information on the share of the product at domestic 
prices, the depth of the formula cut and the “relief” provided by flexibility that generates 21 
 
impacts consistent with our more complex models. The tariff-revenue-loss criterion used 
in our earlier work appears to track closely the overall impact of our full model results.  
A problem for exporters associated with allowing a certain number of tariff lines 
to be sensitive is that this criterion does not take into account the importance of these 
tariff lines to the exporter. If we do this in a crude way by restricting the number of 
products on the basis of their share in total imports, we find a dramatic reduction in the 
damage to market access created by sensitive products.  
Building on recent work by Anderson and Neary (2007), we show in addition 
that, since these exceptions increase the variance of tariffs relative to the formula 
outcome, their effects on economic welfare are much worse than their effects on market 
access. In this sense, the combination of steeply progressive tariff formulas and 
exceptions may be much more rational from a mercantilist point of view than when 
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Table 1. Implications of Sensitive Products for Reductions in Countries’ Average Applied Tariffs 
  Base  Formula  Sens 2  Sens 2-
simple 






Sens 2-sin  Sens 4  Sens 2-
trade 
Country:  %  percentage point cut 
Industrial   14.9  8.5  4.3  4.4  4.7  7.4  7.2  4.3  4.5  3.8  6.8 
Australia  3.1  1.0  0.5  0.5  0.6  1.0  1.0  0.5  0.8  0.5  0.8 
Canada  9.8  5.0  1.5  1.5  1.9  4.8  4.8  1.5  1.5  1.0  3.8 
EFTA  28.9  14.2  7.6  7.5  8.9  14.1  14.1  7.5  7.8  6.1  11.0 
EU  13.4  7.5  4.4  4.4  4.4  6.4  5.9  4.4  4.4  4.0  6.3 
Japan  35.6  22.4  11.2  11.3  12.2  19.1  19.1  11.0  11.2  9.9  18.0 
USA  2.7  0.9  0.4  0.4  0.5  0.9  0.9  0.4  0.4  0.3  0.6 
Developing   14.2  2.5  1.2  1.3  1.4  2.1  2.0  1.2  1.6  1.1  1.8 
ASEAN  8.9  2.3  0.8  0.8  1.1  1.2  1.0  0.8  2.2  0.8  1.9 
China  10.2  2.7  1.8  1.8  1.9  2.2  2.6  1.8  1.8  1.7  2.5 
India  55.4  3.6  1.9  1.9  1.9  3.6  3.4  1.9  2.0  1.8  3.2 
Korea  27.7  10.4  4.2  4.6  5.7  8.6  8.9  4.2  4.2  3.6  5.0 
Maghreb  19.0  3.3  1.7  1.7  1.8  3.3  2.8  1.7  2.2  1.6  2.8 
Mercosur  12.8  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.1 
Mexico  9.5  0.9  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.9  0.9  0.2  0.3  0.2  0.8 
Other SSA  25.3  2.0  0.9  0.9  1.0  2.0  1.1  0.9  1.5  0.8  1.9 
Pakistan  31.3  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
SACU  12.6  0.6  0.3  0.3  0.2  0.6  0.5  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.4 
Turkey  14.1  1.1  0.5  0.4  0.6  1.1  1.1  0.4  0.5  0.4  0.6 
ROW  10.3  1.8  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.4  1.3  1.0  1.4  0.9  1.5 
Non-LDC 
WTO   14.6  6.0  3.1  3.1  3.3  5.2  5.0  3.0  3.2  2.7  4.8 
Notes: Numbers in first column are weighted average agricultural tariffs in 2001 for non-LDC WTO members, adjusted for agreed reductions. Numbers in 
subsequent columns are reductions in percentage points. Column headers name the scenarios: Base: 2001 applied tariffs; Formula: Applies the G20’s tiered 
formula (TF), without sensitive products (SPs); Sens 2: TF with 2% SPs selected according to eq. (4''); Sens 2-simple: TF with 2% SPs, selected using eq. (6); 
Sens 2-elas: TF with 2% SPs, selected using eq. (7); Sens 2-highest bound: TF with 2% SPs, selected by highest bound rates; Sens 2-highest applied: TF with 
2% SPs selected by highest applied rates; Sens 2-tariff losses:TF with 2% SPs selected to minimize tariff loss; Sens 2-sin: Sens 2 TF with 4% SPs selected using 
eq. (4''); Sens 2-trade: TF with 2% SPs , selected using eq. (4'').  
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Table 2. Implications of Sensitive Products for Reductions in Average Tariffs Faced 
 






Country:  %  percentage point cut 
Industrial ctries  15.3  6.5  3.4  3.3  3.7  5.8  5.8  3.3 
Australia  19.1  9.6  4.4  4.4  4.9  8.3  8.5  4.2 
Canada  9.6  4.5  2.0  2.0  2.2  4.4  4.5  2.0 
EFTA  15.6  6.3  4.7  3.5  4.3  6.1  5.6  3.9 
European Union  15.7  5.6  3.3  3.3  3.6  5.4  5.3  3.2 
Japan  10.5  2.4  1.6  1.6  1.8  2.3  2.3  1.6 
USA  16.3  7.5  3.6  3.6  4.0  6.3  6.3  3.6 
Developing ctries  13.8  5.5  2.7  2.8  2.9  4.4  4.1  2.7 
ASEAN  20.6  5.9  3.0  3.0  3.3  4.5  4.2  2.8 
China  15.6  8.2  3.5  4.0  4.1  5.5  5.4  3.8 
India  9.5  3.3  1.6  1.7  1.8  2.9  2.2  1.6 
Korea  16.1  6.6  5.0  4.7  5.1  5.6  5.6  4.1 
Maghreb  14.0  5.5  2.9  4.7  3.0  5.3  5.1  4.5 
Mercosur  13.5  5.0  2.4  2.4  2.5  4.3  3.7  2.4 
Mexico  3.8  1.6  0.8  1.0  1.1  1.5  1.4  0.8 
Other SSA  10.5  5.2  2.3  2.3  2.3  3.3  2.8  2.2 
Pakistan  14.3  6.0  3.2  3.2  3.7  5.8  4.0  3.1 
SACU  18.1  7.2  4.5  4.4  4.3  6.9  6.3  4.4 
Turkey  9.7  3.1  1.5  1.8  1.6  2.1  2.0  1.8 
ROW  12.3  5.5  3.0  2.9  3.0  4.8  4.7  2.9 
Non-LDC WTO   14.6  6.0  3.1  3.1  3.3  5.2  5.0  3.0 
Notes: Numbers in first column are weighted average agricultural tariffs in 2001 faced by WTO members on WTO markets, adjusted for agreed reductions. 
Numbers in subsequent columns are reductions in percentage points. Column headers name the scenarios: Base: 2001 applied tariffs; Formula: Applies the 
G20’s tiered formula (TF), without sensitive products (SPs); Sens 2: TF with 2% SPs selected according to eq. (4''); Sens 2-simple: TF with 2% SPs, selected 
using eq. (6); Sens 2-elas: TF with 2% SPs, selected using eq. (7); Sens 2-highest bound: TF with 2% SPs, selected by highest bound rates; Sens 2-highest 
applied: TF with 2% SPs selected by highest applied rates; Sens 2-tariff losses:TF with 2% SPs selected to minimize tariff loss; Sens 2-sin: Sens 2 TF with 4% 
SPs selected using eq. (4''); Sens 2-trade: TF with 2% SPs , selected using eq. (4'')..26 
 
Table 3.   Products Most Frequently Selected as “Sensitive” 
Industrial Countries 
1  0201 30  Fresh or chilled bovine meat, boneless 
2  0202 30  Frozen, boneless meat of bovine animals 
3  0207 14  Frozen cuts and edible offal of fowls of the species Gallus domesticus 
4  0406 90  Cheese  
5  0603 10  Fresh cut flowers and flower buds, for bouquets or ornamental purposes 
6  0702 00  Tomatoes, fresh or chilled 
7  1001 90  Wheat and meslin (excl. durum wheat) 
8  1701 11  Raw cane sugar (excl. added flavoring or coloring) 
9  2106 90  Food preparations, n.e.s. 
10  2202 90  Non-alcoholic beverages (excl. water, fruit or vegetable juices and milk) 
11  2204 29  Grape juice (including grape must) 
12  2402 20  Cigarettes containing tobacco 
Developing Countries 
1  2402 20  Cigarettes containing tobacco 
2  2208 30  Whiskies 
3  2203 00  Beer made from malt 
4  1701 99  Cane or beet sugar  
5  2204 21  Wine of fresh grapes, incl. fortified wines in bottles 
6  2208 70  Liqueurs and cordials 
7  2208 90  Ethyl alcohol < 80% vol, not denatured; spirits and other spirituous beverages  
8  0207 14  Frozen cuts and edible offal of fowls of the species Gallus domesticus 
9  2403 10  Smoking tobacco 
10  2106 90  Food preparations, n.e.s. 
11  2208 60  Grape juice  
12  1006 30  Semi-milled or wholly milled rice, whether or not polished or glazed 
13  1701 11  Raw cane sugar  
14  1806 31  Chocolate and other preparations containing cocoa, in blocks, slabs or bars of <= 2 kg, 
15  1806 90  Chocolate and other preparations containing cocoa 
Note: fifteen products are included in the list for developing countries because the last four products were 
selected the same number of times.  
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Figure 1. Average applied tariffs resulting from the application of the tiered 
formula, depending on the criterion and threshold used to define sensitive products 
 
 
Note: This graph plots the average applied protection level for non-LDC WTO members, once the 
G20 formula is applied. The share of sensitive products is reported on the x-axis. It is alternatively 
defined as a share in the number of agricultural products, or as a share in imports. Note that even 
sensitive products experience a cut in tariffs, although it is smaller than under the formula, so that 
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Note: Graphs are based on Anderson and Neary's (2007) equation 16 for social welfare and equation 21 for market access. Since generalized moments are equal to 























b. Market access losses



















Appendix Table 1. Products most commonly selected using political economy and highest-tariff rules 
                   
 
With Political Economy criterion  Rank  With highest Bound tariff  Rank  With highest applied tariff  Rank 
Industrial countries  020130  FRESH BOVINE MEAT BONELESS  1  020230  BONELESS  FROZEN MEAT OF BOVINE AN  1  020230  BONELESS  FROZEN MEAT OF BOVINE ANIMALS  1 
Industrial countries  020230  BONELESS  FROZEN MEAT OF BOVINE AN  2  040590  FATS AND OILS DERIVED FROM MILK  2  100630  SEMI MILLED OR WHOLLY MILLED RICE  2 
Industrial countries  020714  FROZEN CUTS & EDIBLE OFFAL OF FOWLS  3  060491  FOLIAGE  BRANCHES & PARTS OF PLANTS  3  240399  CHEWING TOBACCO  SNUFF   3 
Industrial countries  040690  CHEESE  EXCL. FRESH CHEESE   4  070320  GARLIC  FRESH OR CHILLED  4  040590  FATS AND OILS DERIVED FROM MILK  AND DEH  4 
Industrial countries  060310  FRESH CUT FLOWERS AND FLOWER BUDS  5  100620  HUSKED OR BROWN RICE  5  060491  FOLIAGE  BRANCHES AND OTHER PARTS OF PLA  5 
Industrial countries  070200  TOMATOES  FRESH OR CHILLED  6  100630  SEMI MILLED OR WHOLLY MILLED RICE  6  070320  GARLIC  FRESH OR CHILLED  6 
Industrial countries  100190  WHEAT AND MESLIN   7  100640  BROKEN RICE  7  100620  HUSKED OR BROWN RICE  7 
Industrial countries  170111  RAW CANE SUGAR    8  170111  RAW CANE SUGAR  EXCL. ADDED FLAVOUR   8  100640  BROKEN RICE  8 
Industrial countries  210690  FOOD PREPARATIONS N.E.S.  9  230890  MAIZE STALKS  MAIZE LEAVES   9  170111  RAW CANE SUGAR  EXCL. ADDED FLAVOURING  9 
Industrial countries  220290  NON ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES   10  240220  CIGARETTES CONTAINING TOBACCO  10  170199  CANE OR BEET SUGAR   10 
Industrial countries  220429  WINE OF FRESH GRAPES   11  240399  CHEWING TOBACCO  SNUFF   11  220830  WHISKIES  11 
Industrial countries  240220  CIGARETTES CONTAINING TOBACCO  12  010111  PURE BRED BREEDING HORSES  12  220840  RUM AND TAFFIA  12 
Industrial countries  020319  FRESH OR CHILLED MEAT OF SWINE    13  020130  FRESH OR CHILLED BOVINE MEAT  BONEL  13  220850  GIN AND GENEVA  13 
Industrial countries   020329  FROZEN MEAT OF SWINE  EXCL. CARC  14  020319  FRESH OR CHILLED MEAT OF SWINE    14  220860  VODKA  14 
Industrial countries  020713  FRESH OR CHILLED CUTS & EDIBLE OFFAL   15    020322  FROZEN HAMS      220870  LIQUEURS AND CORDIALS  15 
% of Agricultural imports  80 
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                    Developing countries  240220  CIGARETTES CONTAINING TOBACCO  1  220710  UNDENATURED ETHYL ALCOHOL    1  240220  CIGARETTES CONTAINING TOBACCO  1 
Developing countries  220830  WHISKIES  2  220300  BEER MADE FROM MALT  2  220300  BEER MADE FROM MALT  2 
Developing countries  220300  BEER MADE FROM MALT  3  220860  VODKA  3  220830  WHISKIES  3 
Developing countries  170199  CANE OR BEET SUGAR   4  240110  TOBACCO  NOT STEMMED OR STRIPPED  4  240310  SMOKING TOBACCO   4 
Developing countries  220421  WINE OF FRESH GRAPES  INCL. FORT  5  240120  TOBACCO  PARTLY OR WHOLLY STEMMED  5  220890  ETHYL ALCOHOL   5 
Developing countries  220870  LIQUEURS AND CORDIALS  6  240220  CIGARETTES CONTAINING TOBACCO  6  220850  GIN AND GENEVA  6 
Developing countries  220890  ETHYL ALCOHOL  7  020230  BONELESS  FROZEN MEAT OF BOVINE AN  7  240399  CHEWING TOBACCO  SNUFF A  7 
Developing countries  020714  FROZEN CUTS AND EDIBLE OFFAL OF FOWL  8  020629  FROZEN EDIBLE BOVINE OFFAL    8  220429  WINE OF FRESH GRAPES  INCL. FORTIFIED WI  8 
Developing countries  220860  VODKA  9  040690  CHEESE  EXCL. FRESH CHEESE  9  220710  UNDENATURED ETHYL ALCOHOL    9 
Developing countries  240310  SMOKING TOBACCO   10  100300  BARLEY  10  220820  SPIRITS OBTAINED BY DISTILLING GRAPE WIN  10 
Developing countries  210690  FOOD PREPARATIONS N.E.S.  11  100620  HUSKED OR BROWN RICE  11  220860  VODKA  11 
Developing countries  100630  SEMI MILLED OR WHOLLY MILLED RICE  12  100630  SEMI MILLED OR WHOLLY MILLED RICE  12  220870  LIQUEURS AND CORDIALS  12 
Developing countries  170111  RAW CANE SUGAR    13  100890  CEREALS  EXCL. WHEAT AND MESLIN    13  240120  TOBACCO  PARTLY OR WHOLLY STEMMED OR STR  13 
Developing countries  180631  CHOCOLATE AND OTHER PREPARATIONS   14  120220  SHELLED GROUND NUTS   14  170199  CANE OR BEET SUGAR AND CHEMICALLY PURE S  14 
Developing countries  180690  CHOCOLATE AND OTHER PREPARATIONS  15  020322  FROZEN HAMS  SHOULDERS AND CUTS   15  220421  WINE OF FRESH GRAPES  INCL. FORTIFIED WI  15 
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  Note: A list of up to 2% of agricultural tariff lines is selected for each country using equation (6), and the frequency table is generated from these lists. Shares of 
agricultural imports are calculated for industrial and developing country groups by expressing the value of imports sheltered by sensitive product treatment 





This appendix sets out the intermediate steps in the derivation of equations (4''), (5) and (5'). 
 
Our starting point is equation (4'), describing the change in the political-economy objective 
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    (4') 
With  i p ˆ being the relative change in domestic price of good i,  ij η the compensated cross price 
elasticity of good i relative to the price of j ( ii η is the compensated own price elasticity of good 
i),  and i s  the share of good i in total expenditure. 
 
Moreover we assume that: 
 
The price change is  i p ˆ  if product i is not sensitive, and as such subject to the full formula cut, 
and  ) ~ ˆ ( i i p p +  if product i is sensitive, and as such subject to a smaller cut ( 0 ~ ˆ ˆ ≤ + ≤ i i i p p p ). 
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A.  From Equation (4´) to Equation (5): 
 
Looking at the change in policy makers’ objective function resulting from using flexibility to 
reduce the cut in tariffs, we have: 
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B.  From Equation (5) to Equation (5'): 
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Let’s define  p  as the average price change, i.e.  ∑ =
i











































                                                 
1 Using the model and notation of Grossman and Helpman (1994, equation 15), hi is given by 
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗
= �𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗 − 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗
∗�𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗
′ 
where W is economic welfare and mj






 where a is the value placed by policy makers on general economic welfare relative to political 
contributions and Cj is the contribution schedule of sector i.  
2 Alternative estimates of import elasticities of substitution provided by Hummels (2001) and by Broda and 
Weinstein (2006) would allow us to take into account cross-price effects, but these studies focus on substitution 
between products from different suppliers, rather than on the responses of aggregate imports which are our focus 
in this paper. 
3 In an earlier assessment of the impact of flexibilities, Martin and Wang (2004) found little difference between 
results obtained using tariff-line level and six-digit data for the impacts on overall protection considered in this 
paper. While policy makers undoubtedly view some products at finer levels as strongly differentiated, many 
countries have notified their tariffs to the WTO at the six-digit level, and few have notified beyond the eight-
digit level. 
4 Developing countries had 10 years from 1994 to implement their Uruguay Round commitments, as did 
developed countries for a few products. 
5 Assessment of tariff-cutting formulae is complicated in the case of Japan and Korea by the existence of large 
tariff-rate quotas with prohibitive out-of-quota tariffs, the ad valorem-equivalent of which is difficult to gauge. 
Assessments based on tariffs and on observed price differentials were used to compute meaningful ad valorem 
tariff equivalents for rice in Japan and for rice and corn in Korea. 
6 As well as using the conventional trade-weighted averages, we estimated the Trade Restrictiveness Index (TRI) 
and the Mercantilist Trade Restrictiveness Index (Anderson and Neary, 2003) using the approach of Kee, Nicita 
and Olarreaga (2008). In the TRI case, the estimated cuts in tariffs are slightly larger when the elasticity-based 
selection criterion is used. In most cases, the MTRI is cut by slightly less when using this criterion. This is 
related to the correlation between the aggregator used and components of our selection criterion (trade value, 
elasticity, and the square of the tariff). Our key result—that the size of the cut in tariffs is greatly reduced when a 
theoretically-consistent approach to product selection is used—proved robust to the choice of aggregator. 
7 While 2 and 4 percent of tariff lines have been the most widely discussed proposals for sensitive products, the 
EU earlier proposed allowing 8 percent of tariff lines in the industrial countries. WTO (2008) would allow 
developing countries one-third more than the industrial countries. In addition, many developing countries have 
sought flexibility for an additional 20 percent of  “Special Products” subject also to criteria such as food security 
and livelihood security. 
8 The “substantially all trade” criterion for Free Trade Areas under GATT Article XXIV is frequently interpreted 
as limiting exceptions under these agreements to no more than 10 percent of trade. The Doha negotiations on 
non-agricultural products restrict flexibilities using both trade and tariff lines.  